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Baker: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned

DEAF JUSTICE?: BATTERED WOMEN
UNJUSTLY IMPRISONED PRIOR TO THE
ENACTMENT OF EVIDENCE CODE
SECTION 1107
Scott Gregory Baker*
Geneva Love's husband was in the military; they
lived in a military town. Her husband beat her.
Geneva Love was pregnant with their second
child. When she tried to leave the abusive relationship her husband confronted her with more
violence; she was forced to kill him. The importance of evidence concerning Battered Women's
Syndrome was not understood by Geneva Love's
trial attorney. Geneva Love, an African-American
woman, was convicted by an all-white jury of her
husband's peers. Geneva Love was denied justice.
Geneva Love petitioned for clemency. Clemency
was denied. Geneva Love was denied compassion,
and again justice was denied. Geneva Love remains in prison; where is her justice?

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 5, 1993, Assembly Bill 2295 1 (hereinafter AB
2295) was introduced by Assembly Member Barbara Friedman. s
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. I thank my wife, Susanne
Baker, for her patience, love, and support. I thank my editors Donna Kotake and Rebecca Weisman, for their help and support during this project; and Christina Cordoza
and Bridget Ford, for providing me with research materials and insights I would not
have found elsewhere. I thank Professor Roberta Simon for her comments and suggestions regarding organization and style. Special thanks to Professor Susan Rutberg for
challenging me during this project and for providing me with critical substantive law
editing.
1. Assembly Bill 2295, Cal. Leg., 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (proposed Mar. 5, 1993)[hereinafter AB 2295).
2. The Honorable Barbara Friedman is the Assembly Member for the Fortieth Assembly District, California Legislature.

99

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4

100

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:99

On October 11, 1993, the Governor of the State of California3
vetoed AB 2295.· Assembly Bill 2295 was designed to provide a
fair and even application of the law to those individuals affected
by the issue of battered woman syndrome (hereinafter BWS):I
Battered women charged with criminal activity after January 1,
1992 are permitted to present battered woman syndrome expert
testimony at their trials pursuant to Evidence Code Section
1107.8 Battered women convicted prior to this date remain unjustly imprisoned because they have been denied the opportunity to present this crucial evidence, and there is seemingly no
viable avenue of relief. AB 2295 was developed to provide a remedy to these individuals.
Assembly Bill 2295 proposed to give individuals whose convictions for killing their abusive partners became final before
January 1, 1992 a chance for review of their original trial
through a writ of error coram nobis' or writ of error coram
vobis8 • Assembly Bill 2295 would have only affected individuals
whose cases at trial would have been bolstered by the admission
of battered woman syndrome evidence pursuant to Evidence
Code Section 1107.
3. Presently, The Honorable Pete Wilson.
4. Veto Message regarding AB 2295 from The Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor of
California, to The Members of the California Assembly, dated October 11, 1993 [hereinafter Veto]. As of the date this article went to press, AB 2295 was in the process of being
re-introduced in the California Assembly for the 1994-95 Regular Session. The form and
content of the re-introduced bill are as yet unknown.
5. The term Battered Woman Syndrome [hereinafter BWS] is used to describe an
individual's reactions, experiences, and feelings under conditions of repeated violence
and abuse. BWS is not a separate defense. It is an expert's description of a psychological
condition that results from intense trauma. It is useful in explaining to a jury why a
particular battered woman's response to a violent situation was reasonable, and how her
perception of imminence differs from that of a non-battered person.
6. Evidence Code Section 1107, enacted January 1, 1992, established the admissibility of BWS expert testimony in criminal cases. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp.
1993).
7. A writ of error coram nobis is addressed to the court where the petitioner was
convicted. If the judgment was affirmed by an appellate court the writ of error coram
nobis must be brought in the appellate court which affirmed the judgment. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1265 (West Supp. 1993). If there was no appeal, the writ of error coram nobis is
addressed to the trial court.
8. A writ of error coram vobis petition is addressed to a court other than the trial
court, usually an appellate court. The appellate court then directs a writ of error to the
original trial court. Therefore a writ of error coram vobis is only an avenue for relief if no
appeal was taken from the judgment. See Cal. Assembly Committee on Public Safety,
Committee Analysis, May 18, 1993 hearing date; People v. Welch, 394 P.2d 926, 929 (Cal.
1964).
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This article will explain why Assembly Bill 2295 was and
still is necessary to provide relief for battered women convicted
prior to the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, and includes discussions of: BWS theory; use of BWS testimony in
California Courts; Evidence Code Section 1107; and an analysis
of Assembly Bill 2295.
The article will discuss the problem presented by Evidence
Code Section 1107, and critique the only purported "avenue of
relief' available for a battered woman convicted of killing her
abusive partner prior to January 1, 1992, namely executive clemency.9 The article will include a discussion of Geneva Love's
case, which provides a compelling example of the need for an
alternative to clemency, such as AB 2295. The article will outline Governor Wilson's concerns regarding AB 2295. The article
will then respond to Governor Wilson's stated bases for rejecting
the Bill. This will include an argument in support of a version of
AB 2295 modified to address Governor Wilson's concerns with
AB 2295, which will provide a procedure for battered women
convicted of killing their abusive partners prior to the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 to benefit by the provisions
of Evidence Code Section 1107.
II. WHY LEGISLATION LIKE ASSEMBLY BILL 2295 IS
NECESSARY
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

Battered woman syndrome is a description of how a battered woman feels and reacts under conditions of repeated violence and abuse. BWS testimony is of critical importance because it educates the jury as to how a battered person will likely
react in a particular situation. 10
Dr. Lenore Walker defines BWS as a pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in relation9. The Governor may grant clemency, including reprieves, pardons, or commutations after sentence, except in cases involving impeachment. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.
lD. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Battered Women's Response to Violence, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 1993), reprinted in DEFENDING BATTERED
WOMEN IN CRIMINAL CASES (ABA)(1993).
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ships tainted by abuse. l l Dr. Walker's research found the occur- '
rence of a three phase "cycle of violence"12 in many of the cases
of the battered women she interviewed in her early research.
The first phase is a tension-building phase which includes
verbal abuse and minor battering incidents. The woman reacts
by attempting to placate the batterer to prevent an escalation of
violence. These placatory efforts also legitimize the batterer's
belief that he has the right to abuse the woman. As the cycle
progresses, these placatory attempts become less effective and
the tension grows. Many battered women say the worst aspect of
the tension-building phase is the psychological anguish, and
some even provoke an acute incident "to get it over with."lS
The second phase occurs when the violence and verbal
abuse erupt into an acute battering incident, involving brutal violence, injury, and sometimes death. The battered woman cannot predict when the acute battering incident will occur, but
knows it is inevitable. 14 Living in constant fear of injury and
subject to attack at any moment results in a heightened perception of danger in a battered woman. 1II
The final phase of the cycle involves a tranquil period of
loving contrition in which the batterer exhibits apologetic and
loving behavior. The absence of tension and violence creates an
overwhelming feeling of relief. The battered woman believes
that her batterer is sincere when he promises that the violence
will "never happen again. "16
Constant subjection to chronic abuse permanently affects
the psyche of the victim. The battered woman's reactions are
11. See DR. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 4-5 (1989). Dr. Lenore E. Walker
is a clinical and forensic psychologist, and a nationally recognized authority on battered
women. Dr. Walker developed her theory of BWS through research, funded by the National Institutes of Mental Health [hereinafter NIMH1, conducted at the Battered Woman Research Center [hereinafter BWRCl in Denver, Colorado from 1978-81. This research involved interviews with 400 battered women, concerning 1600 battering
incidents. Dr. Walker's books concerning BWS include: THE BATI'ERED WOMAN (1979);
THE BATl'ERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); and TERRIFYING LOVE (1989).
12. WALKER, supra note 11, at 42.
13. See id. at 42-43.
14. WALKER, supra note 11, at 42-43.
15. [d. at 26.
16. [d. at 43-45.
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thus substantially different than a non-battered person's reactions. The failure to understand this leads to one of the most
common, albeit natural, misconceptions concerning the battered
woman, namely, "why does she stay, why not just leave?" Three
theories concerning human behavior help explain why battered
women do not leave the battering relationship:17 the social-learning theory of intermittent. reinforcement,18 Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder,ls and "learned helplessness."2o
17. WALKER, supra note 11, at 47.
18. In the social-learning theory of "intermittent reinforcement," behavioral psychologists have found that behavior which has been intermittently reinforced is the behavior which is the most difficult to stop. For a battered woman, the batterer's random
behavior and unpredictable violence are his main source of power. This random, unpredictable violence, combined with intermittent periods of loving contrition confuse the
battered woman psychologically. From one moment to the next, she does not know
whether she will be faced with her "good" husband or her "bad" husband. The result is
that the battered woman is left psychologically scarred; she can only cling to the hope
that her good husband will return and the violence will end. WALKER, supra note 11, at
47.
19. The experiencing of a significant trauma may result in a psychological diagnosis
known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder [hereinafter PTSD]. Although PTSD-like
symptoms have been diagnosed for over a hundred years, PTSD did not gain prominence
until after the Vietnam War. PTSD symptoms include: (1) a re-experiencing of the
trauma, where the sufferer is unable to stop thinking about the traumatic event; (2)
distancing behavior, including invoking the defense mechanisms of denial, repression,
suppression, and disassociation; and (3) effects on the nervous system, including difficulty sleeping, irritability or outbursts of anger, difficulty concentrating, hypervigilence,
exaggerated startle response, and physiological reactivity. Other traumatic events or feelings of overwhelming helplessness may cause a recalling of the prior trauma, evoking the
feelings and symptoms of the original trauma. The suffering of the traumatic event
whi«h triggers PTSD results in a changed view of the world. The sufferer is more "on
guard" or hypervigilent. PTSD is legally significant because it is a biological and psychological condition which may obliterate free will. Indeed, PTSD is more complex and severe when the trauma is prolonged or severe, as in the case of battered women. See
Nancy Kaser-Boyd, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders in Children and Adults: The Legal Relevance, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. at 1601, 1611-16 (forthcoming 1993)[hereinafter
Kaser-Boyd]; see Steven R. Balash and Nancy Kaser-Boyd, Battered Women in Criminal Cases, DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN IN CRIMINAL CASES (ABA)(1993), at 2-4 [hereinafter Balash & Kaser-Boyd]. BWS is a subcategory of PTSD, and will be classified as
such by the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders [hereinafter DSM], version DSM-IV. See Susan Rutberg, Not Guilty
By Reason of Victimization, FORUM (Dec. 1993).
20. "Learned helplessness" is a theory which was developed by Dr. Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania. To understand learned helplessness, one must focus on an individual's beliefs regarding the situation they are in. As in
the case of PTSD, if a person believes they do not have control over a situation, he will
be more likely to respond with coping responses rather than by trying to escape. As
applied to a battered woman, she does not attempt to leave because she cannot predict
her own safety; she believes that nothing can be done, by her or by anyone else, which
will change her situation. A battered woman is unable to predict the consequences of her
actions, because there is no relationship between her conduct and the frequency of abuse
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A batterer uses intermittent reinforcement by sometimes indulging the battered woman and other times displaying physical
and psychological cruelty.21 This random and unpredictable behavior by the batterer affects the battered woman psychologically, leaving her hoping that the next time will be different.22
Experiencing severe trauma can trigger Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder which may result in certain psychological symptoms including: persistent sense of threat, denial, emotional
"numbing," dissociation, or "self-medicating" with drugs and alcohol,2s The persistent sense of threat can stifle a battered woman's ability to make decisions. 24 Denial causes the battered woman to sense she is in a dangerous relationship but renders her
incapable of admitting that her spouse will kill her.211
"Learned helplessness" occurs when the battered woman
cannot predict her own safety because regardless of her conduct
she is faced with the batterer's random and unpredictable abusive behavior.2s Although a battered woman does not necessarily
learn to be helpless, she often discovers that she is unable to
predict the effect her behavior will have.27 "Learned helplessness" causes a person to choose "behavioral responses which will
have the highest predictability of an effect within the known, or
familiar, situation; they avoid responses - like escape, for instance - that launch them into the unknown."28
Dr. Walker's research was limited to situations involving severe violence over extended periods of time, and concerned batinflicted on her. It is this "learned helplessness" which prevents a battered woman from
leaving the battering relationship, even though it may appear to outsiders that the battered woman could do so safely. Dr. Walker's research has revealed that when a battered
woman attempts to leave, or does leave, the abuse often escalates at the point of separation, and the battered woman faces a greater risk of death. Greater risk is involved when
the battered woman decides to leave. The batterer becomes enraged because his control
is being challenged, and to him the death of the battered woman is a punishment for her
attempting to leave him. WALKER, supra note 11, at 48-51.
21. [d. at 47.
22. [d.
23. Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 6.
24. [d. at 14.
25. [d ..
26. WALKER, supra note 11, at 50.
27. [d.
28. [d. at 50-51.
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tered women who did not fight back. 29 One problem which arises
is that prosecutors have been using BWS theory to impeach a
battered woman witness' testimony because she may not fit
neatly into Dr. Walker's categorical definition of BWS.30 Subsequent research has demonstrated that BWS characteristics also
may be found in situations where less severity is involved and
when the person does fight back. 31 In fact, BWS is neither an
actual clinical diagnosis of a disorder nor a mental illness, but
rather a description of how a norm.al person responds to chronic.
abuse or traumatic stress. 32
B. USE OF BWS TESTIMONY IN CALIFORNIA COURTS
Prior to the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, the
courts of California had not treated the admissibility of BWS
testimony consistently. In fact, the application of BWS evidence
to a self-defense claim was not decided in a California appellate
court case until 1989 in People v. Aris. 33 In the case of a battered woman who claims self-defense in killing her abuser, selfdefense is analyzed as having two requirements:
(1) the defendant's acts causing the victim's death
were motivated by an actual (also referred to as
"genuine" or "honest") belief or perception that
(a) the defendant was in imminent danger of
death or great bodily injury from an unlawful attack or threat by the victim and (b) the defendant's acts were necessary to prevent the injury;
and (2) a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have had the same perception and
done the same acts. 84
29. Cal. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Committee Analysis regarding AB 2273,
June 16, 1992 hearing date [hereinafter AB 2273).
30. See id.
31. [d.; see Dutton, supra note 10; see Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 6.
32. See AB 2273, supra note 29; see Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 2, 10;
see Dutton, supra note 10, at 11.
33. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Ct. App. 1989). The court held that the exclusion of expert testimony regarding BWS was error, but harmless error in the context of
the case because the defendant had shot her batterer while he slept. Therefore, there was
nothing in his behavior indicating the existence of an imminent danger as that term is
defined by California law, and it is not reasonably probable that BWS testimony would
convince the jury that, nevertheless, the defendant honestly perceived an imminent danger resulting in a different verdict.
34. [d. at 172.
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Under the California Penal Code, the classification for a
homicide committed in self-defense is a justifiable homicide, as
opposed to an excusable homicide. 811 Excuses for homicide include accident, misfortune, sufficient provocation, insanity and
provocation, and a genuine, but unreasonable, belief in the need
for self-defense. 86 Justification declares the allegedly criminal
act legal, while excuse admits the act's criminality but declares
the allegedly criminal actor not to blame. 87
Two types of self-defense exist in California: perfect selfdefense and imperfect self-defense. 88 Perfect self-defense89 requires both subjective honesty and objective reasonableness, and
completely exonerates the accused. 40 Subjective honesty evaluates the defendant's state of mind. u Objective reasonableness
questions whether a reasonable person would have believed and
acted as the defendant did. 42 Imperfect self-defense requires
only subjective honesty and negates malice aforethought, reducing the homicide to voluntary manslaughter. 48 Both perfect and
imperfect self-defense require an honest belief that the killer is
in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from the
victim. 44
BWS expert testimony is useful in the defense of battered
women accused of killing their abusive spouses because it can
explain why a particular battered woman subjectively believed
that her self-defense was necessary. Because BWS can illustrate
why a particular battered woman had an honest belief of imminent danger,411 it should be used in the objective reasonableness
test to show why a battered woman believed and acted as she
did.
In Aris, the defendant, a battered woman, appealed a sec35.
36.
37.
38.

See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 195, 197 (West 1988).
See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178; CAL. PENAL CODE § 195.
Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79.
See id. at 172.
39. Perfect self-defense is also referred to as "reasonable" or "complete" 8elf-defense. [d. at 172.
40. [d. at 172.
41. [d. at 179.
42. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
43. [d.
44. [d. at 171.
45. Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 16.
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ond degree murder conviction because the trial court excluded
BWS expert testimony which would have revealed that BWS affected her mental condition at the time of the killing. 46 On the
night of the killing, Brenda Aris' abusive husband beat her and
threatened that he did not think he would let her live until the
next morning,''' When her husband fell asleep she went next
door for some ice fot her injuries. 46 She found a gun and took it
for protection. 49 She thought that when she returned home she
would again be beaten.lio Aris went to the bedroom, sat on the
bed, and shot her sleeping husband five times in the back. iiI
In Aris, the court held that expert BWS testimony about a
defendant's state of mind was not relevant to the objective reasonableness of the defendant's actions in self-defense. iiI The
court found that the defendant presented no substantial evidence that a reasonable person under the same circumstances
would have perceived an imminent danger and a need to kill in
self-defense. 1i8 The court believed no reasonable jury could conclude that a sleeping victim presents an imminent danger of
great bodily harm, especially when the defendant left the bedroom and subsequently returned to shoot the victim.1i4 Nevertheless, the court also held that it was error not to permit an expert
to testify about the defendant's particular experiences as a battered woman and its effect on her perceptions of danger, its imminence, and what actions were necessary to protect herself.1i1i
The court found that the error was harmless because Aris' own
testimony showed that there was nothing in the victim's behavior indicating the existence of imminent danger. 1i6
Relying on the expert testimony of Dr. Lenore E. Walker,
the court stated that a woman who has been battered and then
threatened with more abuse is more likely to perceive the danger
46. Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
47.Id.
48.Id.
49.Id.
50.Id.
51. Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
52. Id. at 180.
53. Id. at 176.
54.Id.
55.Id.
56. Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
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involved faster than one who has not been abused. 1I7 The court
found that a battered woman accurately senses when an abusive
episode is not yet over.1I8 However, the court cautioned that the
jury may misuse BWS evidence to establish the reasonableness
requirement for perfect self-defense.1I9 Upon request by the prosecution, the judge should instruct the jury that self-defense testimony is relevant only to prove the honest belief requirement
for both perfect and imperfect self-defense, not to .prove the reasonableness requirement for perfect self-defense. 6o
Two years after Aris was decided, another court held that
failure to present evidence of BWS constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 61 In People v. Day, the court reversed a judgment convicting a battered woman of involuntary manslaughter
and assault with a deadly weapon. 62 Valoree Day was living with
Steve Brown, an abusive partner. 6S On the night of the killing
they argued, he battered her, and she locked herself in the bedroom. 64 Day testified that Brown opened the door and attacked
her with a knife. 611 A struggle ensued and Brown was mortally
injured; Day fled. 66 Day's appeal was based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 67 Day's trial counsel admitted that he was
unaware of the existence of BWS before and during trial and
never considered investigation, research, or presentation of expert witness testimony regarding BWS.68 The Day court followed the Aris court, holding that expert testimony regarding
BWS is not relevant to the reasonableness of the accused's actions in self-defense, but held that BWS evidence was admissible to rehabilitate the defendant's credibility before the jury.6e
In presenting its case, the prosecution used many of the stereotypes and commonly held misconceptions about battered
57. [d. at 177.
58. [d.
59. [d. at 180-81.

[d. at 181.
People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 917 (Ct. App. 1992).
[d.
[d. at 917-18.
[d. at 919.
[d.
See Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919.
[d. at 916-17.
68. [d. at 920.
69. [d. at 922.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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women,70 such as the stereotype and misconception that battered women can easily leave their batterers. 71 The prosecution
used this basic misconception to challenge the defendant's credibility before the jury by asking the question, "why did she not
simply leave?"72 In fact, the defense counsel characterized the
defendant's relationship with her batterer as "mutual combat."7s
The misconception about battered women is that they all behave in the same way and if a w,oman dares to fight back she
removes herself from the category of women for whom BWS is
available as a defense. 7•
On appeal, a psychologist and authority on BWS submitted
an affidavit supporting appellant's motion for a new trial. 711 The
affidavit dispelled many myths associated with BWS which were
used by the prosecution to question defendant's credibility during the trial,76 The affidavit established that battered women do
employ active self-defense as a strategy.77 The court held that
evidence explaining BWS informs the jury that how they think
the average reasonable person would behave and how the jury
thinks they personally would behave are not necessarily the
same way that people who have been battered in fact behave. 78
The court understood that when deciding a case where a battered woman kills her batterer, the jury will ask "what would I
do in that situation?" Most people who are unaware of BWS
would naturally answer this question, "I would just leave." BWS
testimony helps explain why the battered woman does not leave
and helps a jury understand the psychological effects battering
has on a battered woman. BWS theory explains how a battered
woman can accurately sense that danger still exists and why her
subjectively honest belief is that she must act to save her life.
The legislature realized that the general public lacks a thor70. ld. at 925.
71. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923; See supra text accompanying note 28.
72. See Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923.
73. ld. at 923.
74. See id.
75. ld. at 920.
76. See Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920-21. Myths regarding battered women include:
battered women are free to leave the relationship at any time; and battered women do
not defend themselves against their batterers. ld.
77. ld. at 920.
78. ld. at 925.
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ough understanding of the issue of domestic violence and therefore BWS expert testimony should play an important role in a
criminal action where the defendant asserts a plea of selfdefense. 79
C. CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1107
California Evidence Code Section 1107 was enacted on January 1, 1992.80 Evidence Code Section 1107 permits expert testimony concerning BWS to be admitted in a criminal action. 81 In
pertinent part, Section 1107 states: "In a criminal action, expert
testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the defense
regarding battered women's syndrome, including the physical,
emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of viCtims of domestic violence. "82
The purpose of the Bill was to ensure that the courts admit
BWS evidence in criminal cases. 8S Existing law held that BWS
testimony was relevant to show that the defendant genuinely believed she was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.84
Where a defendant's own testimony establishes facts tending to
show there was nothing in the victim's behavior indicating the
existence of an imminent danger, BII there is no reasonable
probability that BWS testimony would convince the jury that
nevertheless the defendant honestly perceived an imminent
danger. B8
The legislature envisioned use of Evidence Code Section
1107's provisions in the defense of a battered woman who has
killed or seriously wounded her abuser. In this context, the BWS
expert testimony would be used to support a claim of self79. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
80. See id.
81. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
82. See id.
83. Assembly Bill 785, Cal. Leg., 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (proposed Feb. 26, 1991)[hereinafter AB 785).
84. [d.
85. As defined by California law, an imminent danger is one that, from appearances,
must be instantly dealt with. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
86. This is exemplified in the situation where the battered woman kills her batterer
while he sleeps; e.g., the situation in Aris. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
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defense. 87
To date, only one Court of Appeal has published a decision
which mentions Section 1107. In People v. Romero,88 the court
interpreted the language of Section 1107 to make expert testimony admissible in any criminal case regardless of the charges
or defenses. 89 However, expert testimony cannot be used to prosecute a batterer for his acts using the BWS evidence to prove
the occurrence of the acts. 90
In Romero, the defendant had been charged with one count
of second degree robbery and four counts of attempted robbery.91 She raised the defense of duress, but the jury convicted
her as charged. 92 Her petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
based on the fact that her trial lawyer failed to present expert
testimony explaining BWS.9S The court found that the key issue
in the defenses of duress and self-defense is whether the defendant reasonably and honestly believed 'she was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death. 94 The court held that the rule
permitting expert BWS testimony in a self-defense case necessarily permits it in a case where duress is claimed as a defense. 911
BWS evidence was relevant to the woman's credibility and to
support her testimony that she had a good-faith, objectively reasonable, and honest belief that her act was necessary to prevent
an imminent threat of greater harm. 96 Evidence of BWS explains a behavior pattern that might otherwise appear unreasonable to jurors by explaining how a battered woman might think,
react, or behave, and placing the behavior in an understandable
light. 97 Apparently, the California Supreme Court agrees with
this holding. 98
87. AB 785, supra note 83.
88. People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332 (Ct. App. 1992), review granted, in part,
on other grounds, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120 (1993).
89. [d. at 338 n.9.
90. [d.
91. [d. at 333.
92. [d.

93. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
94. [d. at 338.

95.
96.
97.
98.
tion for

[d. at 339.
[d.
[d. at 341.
See generally People v. Romero, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120 (Cal. 1993)(granting petireview limited to whether a writ of habeas corpus or an order to show cause must
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The legislature enacted Evidence Code Section 1107 realizing the importance of BWS expert testimony. However, Evidence Code Section 1107 only applies to cases where the defendant's trial occurred after January 1, 1992. An unanswered
question remains: What is to be done for battered women convicted of killing their abusive partners prior to January 1, 1992?
AB 2295 is not concerned with the importance of BWS expert
testimony; this is a given in light of Section 1107's enactment.
Rather, AB 2295 seeks to cure the inequity Section 1107 creates
by only applying the provisions allowing BWS expert testimony
from January 1, 1992 forward.
D. ANALYSIS

OF

ASSEMBLY BILL 2295

AB 2295 proposed to give individuals whose convictions became final before January 1, 1992, the date when the legislature
enacted Evidence Code Section 1107, a chance for review of
their original trial through a writ of error coram nobis or writ of
error coram vobis. 99 The basis for AB 2295 was to apply justice
to all people similarly situated in an equal manner. AB 2295
passed the Senate 100 and the Assembly concurred,IOI sending it
to enrollment102 on September 10, 1993.103 The Governor vetoed
AB 2295 on October 11, 1993. 104 As of the date this article went
to press, AB 2295 was in the process of being re-introduced in
the California Assembly.
1.

Modification Of Writs Of Error Coram Nobis And Error Coram Vobis Under AB 2295

The distinction between a writ of error coram nobis and a
writ of error coram vobis is that coram nobis is addressed to the
court where the petitioner was convicted, and coram vobis is
issue before a petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted).
99. AB 2295, supra note 1.
100. AB 2295 passed the Senate Floor by a vote of 24-5.
101. The Assembly concurred in the Senate's approval of AB 2295 by a vote of 68-3.
102. An "enrolled bill" is defined as "The final copy of a bill or joint resolution
which has passed both houses of a legislature and is ready for signing." BUCK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 276 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983).
103. Cal. Bill Tracking, AB 2295, Cal. Leg., 1993-94 Reg. Sess.
104. See Veto, supra note 4.
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typically directed to an appellate court. 1011 If the judgment was
affirmed by an appellate court, the writ of error coram nobis
must be filed in the appellate court which affirmed the judgment. 106 A writ of error coram vobis is only an avenue for relief
if no appeal was taken from the judgment. As the writs of error
coram nobis and error coram vobis are essentially identical,107
this article will only discuss the process in terms of a writ or
error coram nobis.
A writ of error coram nobis is the equivalent of a motion to
vacate the judgment. 106 In People v. Shipman, the California
Supreme Court set forth three requirements necessary for the
granting of a writ of coram nobis: (1) petitioner must show that
some fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his
part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits,
and which if presented, would have prevented the rendition of
the judgment; (2) petitioner must show that the newly discovered evidence does not go to the merits of issues tried; and (3)
petitioner must show that the facts upon which he relies were
not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence
have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier
than the time of his motion for the writ. 109
The requirements for the granting of a writ of error coram
nobis are very strict. no In People v. Esquibel, an order granting
a petition for writ of error coram nobis was reversed when the
court found that: (1) the new evidence raised related to the merits of the issues tried, and (2) even if it had been known at the
time of trial it was not such that it would have resulted in a
different verdict. 111
AB 2295 sought to amend the Penal Code requirements for
105. See generally People v. Esquibel, 118 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750 (Ct. App. 1975)(finding jurisdiction for a writ of error coram nobis to exist in the trial court because the final
judgment had not been appealed); see Cal. Assembly Committee on Public Safety, Committee Analysis, May 18, 1993 hearing date.
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1265.
107. See People v. Welch, 394 P.2d 926, 929 (Cal. 1964).
108. People v. Shipman, 397 P.2d 993, 994 n.2 (Cal. 1965).
109. See id. at 995.
110. [d.
111. See generally Esquibel, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 750 (concerning whether defendant
intentionally hit officer with his truck, the new evidence was that defendant was looking
back when the truck struck the officer).
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a writ of error coram nobis and writ of error coram vobis in cases
involving BWS. The major change AB 2295 proposed concerning
writs of error coram nobis was from the standard that petitioner
must show some fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his part, was not presented to the court at the trial on
the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the
rendition of the judgment. 112 The proposed standard under AB
2295 was a "reasonable probability" that the result would have
been different had the evidence. of BWS been presented, sufficient to undermine the confidence in the judgment of conviction.113 This only involves evidence that would have been admitted pursuant to Evidence Code Section 1107,114
The standard of "reasonable probability" comes from
Strickland v. Washington,llG a case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Strickland Court stated that a
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.118 A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.l1'7 The Strickland
court stated that a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result
is challenged. 118
The reasonable probability standard was chosen for use in
AB 2295 because the basis of a petition for a writ under AB 2295
was that BWS testimony was not admitted at trial. This standard admits that the reason the evidence was not admitted or
offered during the trial was because the attorney or judge did
not understand the critical importance of BWS testimony to the
case. The claim is most certainly an attack on the fundamental
fairness of the proceeding whose result is challenged. In most
cases, it is reasonably probable that had BWS testimony been
admitted it would have affected the outcome of the case.l18 Ad112. Shipman, 397 P.2d at 995 (emphasis added).
113. AB 2295. supra note 1.
114. Id.
115. See generally Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)(defining the standard of review in an appeal involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
116. Id. at 694.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 697.
119. See Balash & Kaser-Boyd. supra note 19. at 16-18.
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mission of BWS testimony would not necessarily result in an acquittal, but possibly a reduced sentence, and perhaps most importantly, the battered women presently incarcerated would be
judged under the same law as women who had the opportunity
to use Evidence Code Section 1107.
2. Requirements For The Petition For Writ Of Error
Coram Nobis Or Writ Of Error Coram Vobis Under AB
2295

AB 2295 would have required a court to grant a verified petition for a writ of error coram nobis or writ of error coram vobis
if: (1) the petitioner's judgment of conviction for killing her
abuser resulted from a plea or trial that commenced before January 1, 1992, and petitioner is imprisoned at the time of filing
the verified petition; (2) the foundational requirements of Evidence Code Section 1107 are met,120 based on facts set forth in
the verified petition; (3) any material evidence that would have
been admissible pursuant to Evidence Code Section 1107 was
not admitted, and the facts established on a hearing of the writ
show that had the evidence of BWS been presented, there was a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would
have been different, sufficient to undermine confidence in the
judgment of conviction; and (4) the BWS evidence related to the
battering of the petitioner by the victim of the homicide. 1111
AB 2295 would have required that the court consider
whether any evidence of abuse existed in the record, or whether
the underlying facts of abuse alleged by the petitioner were asserted by the petitioner prior to conviction or were corroborated
by other evidence. laB Corroborating evidence includes, but is not
limited to, medical records, verified witness statements, and
court records from any other proceeding. 11l8 This language was
added to assuage the concerns that AB 2295 would create a flood
of petitions for writs of error coram nobis or coram vobis,
wherein some petitioners would fabricate claims that they were
120. The proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert witness. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
121. AB 2295, supra note 1.
122.Id.
123. Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4

116

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:99

sufferers of BWS in order to seek reduced sentences or release
from prison. 124
3. Procedural Options Available To Court Reviewing Petitions Under AB 2295
AB 2295(d) would have provided the court with the options
found in Penal Code Sections 1260, 1261, and 1262 in handling
petitions for writs of error coram nobis or coram vobis under AB
2295. 1lI1i
Penal Code Section 1260 provides:
The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a
judgment or order appealed from, or reduce
the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the punishment imposed, and may
set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the
proceedings subsequent to, or dependent
upon, such judgment or order, and may, if
proper, order a new trial and may, if proper,
remand the cause to the trial court for such
further proceedings as may be just under the
circumstances. 1II8
Section 1261 requires a new trial, if ordered, to be had in
the court of the county from which the appeal was taken.187 Section 1262 directs that if a judgment is reversed, it will be
deemed an order for a new trial, unless the appellate court directs otherwise. 128 Should the appellate court direct a final disposition in defendant's favor, it must direct defendant to be discharged from custody, if defendant is in custody.129 These
options grant the court wide discretion in dealing with petitions
under AB 2295, and should provide sufficient safeguards against
abuse by fraudulent petitions.
124. Notes from Assemblywoman Barbara Friedman concerning AB 2295 as
amended Sept. 8, 1993.
125. AB 2295, supra note 1.
126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West 1982).
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1261 (West 1982).
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1262 (West 1982). Section 1262 also deals with issues such
as return of bail posted, and fines paid. [d.
129. 1d.

.
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SECTION

1107
A.

EVIDENCE CODE SECTION

1107

ONLY ApPLIES PROSPECTIVELY

Evidence Code Section 1107 only applies to battered women
whose trials occurred after January 1, 1992.180 Battered women
convicted prior to this date were convicted without the opportunity to admit BWS expert testimony provided for by Evidence
Code Section 1107. These women are unjustly imprisoned because they have been denied this critical opportunity. AB 2295
sought to provide a remedy to this injustice.
B. CLEMENCY Is NOT A REALISTIC AVENUE FOR RELIEF

Presently, the only avenue of relief open to battered women
convicted of killing their abusers prior to January 1, 1992 is to
petition the Governor of California for clemency. Clemency is
defined as "{kJindness, mercy, leniency . .. [and] describers an]
act of [a] governor of [a] state when he commutes [a] death sentence to life imprisonment, or grants a pardon."13I The Governor
may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation after sentence,
except in cases of impeachment. 132 In considering clemency requests, the Governor consults with the Board of Prison Terms l33
and the judge of the court of conviction or the district attorney
regarding the facts of the case and recommendations as to the
propriety of clemency.I34
Regrettably, Governor Wilson has been slow to take action
on the clemency petitions filed by battered women serving state
prison sentences for killing their abusive partners,13& and when
130. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
131. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 131 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983)(emphasis added).
132. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.
133. The Board of Prison Terms periodically recommends a pardon or commutation
on the basis of good conduct, disproportionate sentencing, or other good cause. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 4801 (West 1982); Cal. Committee Analysis regarding AB 2373 for the
Senate Committee on Judiciary, June 16, 1992 hearing date.
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4803 (West 1982).
135. See Minouche Kandel, Wilson Doesn't Get It - Governor Misses the Point
About Battered Women, DAILY J., June 17, 1993, at 4. Governor Wilson has taken two
years to review the petitions of 33 women who filed for clemency. In the two cases in
which he granted clemency Wilson expressly stated that he was basing his decision on
factors other than that the women were justified in defending themselves against their
abusive partners. Id.
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he has taken action it has not been encouraging. 138 In fact, under
Governor Wilson clemency does not appear to be a viable avenue of relief for battered women convicted prior to the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107.
C.

GENEVA LOVE'S CASE AS EXAMPLE OF GOVERNOR WILSON'S
"UNDERSTANDING" OF THE ISSUES CONCERNING BWS

One case in particular provides both an example of Governor Wilson's approach to clemency and the basis for a compelling argument in support of the necessity of AB 2295. Geneva
Love is a battered woman who is serving a sentence of 17 years
to life for killing her abusive husband, Azell, during an acute
battering incident set off by her attempt to leave the relationship.137 The jury convicted her of second degree murder. 13S At
the time of the killing, in 1988, Geneva Love was the mother of a
2 Y2 year old son, and was pregnant with her second child. iSS
She had been repeatedly battered and emotionally abused by
her husband for years. l•O She endured this violence and abuse
because she loved her husband and, like most battered women,
believed him when he would apologize and promise that he
would never hurt her again. w Azell Love was in the military,
stationed at Fort Ord. H2 He was a heavy drinker and a physically powerful man. 143
Two days before the killing, the Loves began arguing about
whether their young son should sleep with them. H • Mr. Love
shoved Geneva Love to the floor.lu As she rose, he came at her,
pushing her in the chest with his forearm; again she fell to the
136. See generally Hallye Jordan, Killers Could Seek Retrial for Syndrome, DAILY
J., August 17, 1993 at 1, 7. To date, Wilson has granted two petitions and rejected 14
others out of 33 filed.
137. Letter from Christina G. Cordoza, Esq., to The Honorable Barbara Friedman 1
(June 15, 1993)[hereinafter Cordoza](on file with author). Cordoza is Geneva Love's
post-conviction counsel.
138. See supra note 135.
139. Cordoza at 1.
140. [d.

141. [d.
142. [d.
143. [d.
144. Reporter's Transcript at 428-29, People v. Geneva Love (No. MCR6991)(1989).
145. [d.
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floor.14e Geneva Love grabbed a slat from the bed frame in order
to protect herself. l47 Mr. Love grabbed the board and again
knocked Geneva Love to the ground. l48 For the next half hour,
Mr. Love repeatedly punched Geneva Love in the face and the
rest of her body, and threw her across the room, knowing she
was pregnant. 149 Mr. Love threw Geneva Love against a piece of
furniture; the corner hit her in the rib cage. lllO Mr. Love threw
her against the closet with such force that the door split in
half.lIIl Each time Geneva Love fell to the floor, Mr. Love continued to deliver blows to her face and body with his fists.lIIll
Finally, Mr. Love rammed Geneva against the bedroom door,
smashing her head against the metal hinges. 11l3
When Geneva Love did not get up, Mr. Love threatened to
hurt their young son.11l4 Geneva Love did not believe Mr. Love
would hurt his own son.lllll Mr. Love picked up their son by the
collar, causing his head to fling backward unsupported. IllS Geneva Love then heard the sound of Mr. Love hitting their son.11l7
Geneva Love immediately went to get her son. 11l8
After this beating, Geneva Love began packing, determined
to leave the relationship.11l9 She begged her husband to buy her
and their son bus tickets so they could leave, and he agreed. ISO
Mr. Love left the house, purportedly to purchase the tickets, but
did not return until the next morning. lei When he did return, he
threw the ticket at Geneva Love and told her the bus left in
thirty minutes. lell When Geneva Love questioned him about the
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

[d. at 429-30.
[d. at 430.
[d. at 431-32.
Reporter's Transcript at 432, People v. Geneva Love (No. MCR6991)(1989).
[d. at 428-29.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Reporter's Transcript at 433, People v. Geneva Love (No. MCR6991)(1989).
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 434.
Cordoza at 1.
[d.
[d.
See Cordoza at 1-2.
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delay Mr. Love became angry and violent. ISS Fearing that the
inevitable beating she would receive would be worse than the
prior day's, she called the military police for help. IS. The officer
who answered decided her call was not one of "distress" and told
her to call the city police because she was out of his jurisdiction. ls5 As she tried to call the city police, Mr. Love charged at
her, twisting his arm around her neck while he disabled the
phone. ISS He told her she could not leave and that he would kill
her before she jeopardized his job. ls7 Geneva Love believed his
threat; terrified and fearing for the safety of her young son and
herself, she ran to the bedroom to get her husband's gun. IS8 Geneva Love pointed the gun at her husband and begged him to
leave. ls9 Rather than leave, Mr. Love turned on his wife in a
manner that made her believe he was going to immediately
lunge at her.l7° Geneva Love was forced to fire the gun, the bullet striking her husband in the neck. l7l Geneva Love's actions
were not designed to kill her husband. This is evidenced by the
fact that she tried to stop the bleeding and to obtain emergency
help.172 Nevertheless, Mr. Love later died. 17S
Geneva Love, an African-American, was tried by an allwhite jury.174 Seven of the jurors had family in the military; the
judge was himself a retired military man, and Geneva Love's
husband was a soldier with a good record. m Monterey County,
the trial venue, is a "military town,"17S home to Fort Ord, Fort
Hunter-Liggett, the Presidio of Monterey, the Defense Language
Institute, and the Naval Postgraduate School. 177 These factors
alone are demonstrative of the hostile and insensitive climate
163.
164.
165.
166.

[d. at 2.
[d.
[d.
See id.

167. Cordoza at 2.
168. [d.
169. [d.
170. See id.
171. [d.

172. Cordoza at 2.
173. [d.
174. [d.
175. [d.; Letter from Richard Rosen, Esq., to The Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor

of California 2 (Aug. 31, 1992)[hereinafter Rosenj(on file with author). Rosen was Geneva Love's trial counsel.
176. Rosen at 2.
177. [d.
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Geneva Love must have faced during her trial.178 However, most
important, Geneva Love's trial counsel did not explore the facts
regarding BWS with Geneva Love and decided not to introduce
expert testimony regarding BWS.179 Instead, her attorney decided to rely on what he deemed an extremely strong case of
self-defense. 18o
In a letter supporting Geneva Love's petition for clemency,
her trial attorney stated that he feared that BWS evidence
would confuse the issues or might not be accepted by the jury or
the judge. 181 In hindsight, her trial attorney now believes he
should have introduced BWS evidence in Geneva Love's case. In
He believes that BWS testimony could have rehabilitated Geneva Love's credibility on the witness stand in the eyes of the
jury.18S BWS testimony would explain to the jury why Geneva
Love's testimony may have appeared reserved and cold. 18• After
all, BWS expert testimony could explain to a jury that victims of
battering relationships do not react in the same way that someone who has not been battered would react. 1811
After reviewing her Application for Executive Clemency, the
trial judge wrote a letter supporting the Application. 18e The trial
judge concluded that if evidence of BWS had been presented at
the trial, "it is very likely that there would have been an acquittal instead of a conviction. m8 '1 He believed that justice would be
served by a grant of Executive Clemency in Geneva Love's
case. 188
Governor Wilson denied Geneva Love's petition for clemency on May 27, 1993. 189 In his decision, he acknowledged his
178. See id.
179. [d.
180. [d.
181. Rosen at 2.
182. [d.
183. See id.
184. [d.
185. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925.
186. Letter from The Honorable Robert M. Hinrichs, Judge of the Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of Monterey, to The Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor of California 1 (Dec. 21, 1992)[hereinafter Hinrichs](on file with author).
187. [d. (emphasis added).
188. [d.
189. Decision, In the Matter of the Clemency Request of Petitioner A, at 4 (May 27,
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"deep and abiding concern with the tragic problem of domestic
violence. "leo Wilson claimed that he is now, and always has
been, committed to the cause of victims of domestic violence. lei
Wilson pointed out that the clemency process is not a continuation of the judicial process of a criminal defendant.1e2 He argued
that without the safeguards and sanctions available to the court,
he is not in a position to retry criminal cases or to speculate as
to what might have been if different evidence had been before a
jury.1eS Governor Wilson did not address the trial judge's letter
supporting Geneva Love's application for clemency.
Wilson stated that the exercise of his clemency power requires him to balance a concern for objective justice against a
claim for compassion based on facts which may mitigate the
penalty for the crime. 1e4 Although moved by the personal factors
of Geneva Love's case, Wilson stated that:
[T]he test of whether clemency should be considered in cases where BWS is asserted, either as a
defense or mitigation, for the petitioner's deliberate taking of the abuser's life must be: Did petitioner have the option to leave the abuser, or was
the homicide realistically her only chance to escape him, and further serious physical abuse?1911

It is astonishing that someone who claims to have a "broad

commitment to the cause of battered women" could formulate a
test such as Wilson's. He ignores the symptoms and behavior of
a battered woman. BWS helps explain why battered women do
not have the same "option to leave the abuser" as someone in a
non-battering relationship. lee The unpredictable, yet inevitable
brutality which battered women suffer at the hands of their batterers results in symptoms of "learned helplessness,"le? and an
inability to leave.
1993)[hereinafter Denial](on file with author).
190. [d. at 1.
191. See id.
192. [d. at 3.
193. [d.
194. Denial, supra note 189.
195. [d. (emphasis added).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28; see Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra
note 19, at 14, 18; see Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924.
197. See AB 2273, supra note 29.
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The answer to the second part of Wilson's question: "[W]as
the homicide realistically her only chance to escape him, and
further serious physical abuse?" is more than likely a yes in
most battered women's cases. However, "realistically" needs to
be defined through the eyes of a battered woman. Failure to consider BWS in defining "realistically" will result in the use of
misconceptions concerning battered women to compare a battered woman's conduct against the perceptions and experiences
of someone who has never been abused. 1S8 BWS testimony is
critically important because it educates the jury as to how a battered person will likely react in a particular situation.
Not only is Governor Wilson's test for clemency fundamentally flawed in asking if the battered woman could leave, but
when this test is applied to Geneva Love's case, it is applied incorrectly. Geneva Love was psychologically incapable of leaving
her abuser. When she did in fact muster the bravery to attempt
to leave she was physically confronted by her abusive husband
and rendered physically incapable of leaving. In Geneva Love's
case it appears that killing her abusive husband was her only
chance to escape him and further serious physical harm. She did
not want to shoot; she was forced to shoot.
Furthermore, although Governor Wilson argued that he is
not in a position to retry a criminal case, he nevertheless applies
the same legal test a trial court would have applied prior to the
enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 by ignoring the role
BWS evidence should play in a review of a petition for clemency. BWS evidence will help explain a particular battered woman's reactions to the situation she was confronted with when
she killed her abusive spouse. Without weighing the effects of
BWS, Governor Wilson is unnecessarily restricting his exercise
of the clemency power. 1SS
One might interpret Governor Wilson's denial of Geneva
Love's clemency as a message to the Legislature that the remedy
for women convicted of killing their abusive partners prior to
the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 will not be found
198. See Balash & Kaser·Boyd, supra note 19, at 16-18; see Dutton, supra note 10,
at 12.
199. See Cookie Ridolfi, Esq., Governor Improperly Restricted Use of Pardoning
Power, ST. B. BULL., July 28, 1993, 1, 3-4.
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in the Governor's office. In fact, the executive director of the
California District Attorneys Association/aoo a supporter of Governor Wilson's test for clemency, admits that "[j]ustice is only
served if a woman's assertion of BWS is supported by the facts
of her case and there is overwhelming evidence that the homicide was the result of the abuse."201 The implied message is that
a remedy should come from the enactment of a law setting up a
procedure to give these women an opportunity for a new trial
based on fairness and justice.
IV. GOVERNOR WILSON'S REASONS FOR VETO OF AB
2295

Governor Wilson's veto of AB 2295 was based essentially on
three areas of concern. Governor Wilson stated that although
the Bill "is obviously well intended,"202 he and "[s]everal elected
District Attorneys in the state"20S believe it is an inappropriate
solution.
Governor Wilson's first concern is that he does not believe a
generally applicable writ process should be modified for particular types of psychological defenses. 204 He is concerned that AB
2295 could establish a precedent for recognizing and providing
special requirements for "other novel defenses" which may develop or gain greater acceptability after a defendant's trial is
over. 2011
Second, Governor Wilson believes that a defendant who believes an impropriety occurred at trial has other legal alternatives available. 206
Finally, Governor Wilson believes that the presumption
favoring the finality of convictions and judgments is so strong in
200. Michael W. Sweet is the executive director of the California District Attorneys
Association.
201. See Michael W. Sweet, Esq., Legal Test Prevents License to Kill by Battered
Women, ST. B. BULL., July 28, 1993, 1, 3.
202. Veto Message regarding AB 2295 from the Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor of
California, to the Members of the California Assembly, dated October 11, 1993.
203. [d.
204. [d. at 1-2.
205. [d. at 2.
206. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/4

26

Baker: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned

1994]

BATTERED WOMEN UNJUSTLY IMPRISONED

125

cases where a defendant openly admits his or her own culpability that no collateral challenge should be allowed. 207 He is concerned that AB 2295 would allow the re-litigation of guilty pleas
which would be extremely difficult for a reviewing court to
handle. 208
V.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNOR WILSON'S VETO
MESSAGE

The concerns Governor Wilson expressed in his veto message of AB 2295 appear assuagable. Many District Attorneys did
oppose AB 2295 when it was first introduced on March 5,
1993. 209 However, when AB 2295 was sent to the Governor, the
California District Attorneys Association (hereinafter CDAA)
wrote Governor Wilson's office that it would no longer oppose
the Bill.210 The CDAA letter stated that AB 2295 had been narrowed considerably to prevent abuse and therefore provided sufficient safeguards. 211
First, Governor Wilson's concern with modifying the error
coram nobis and error coram vobis writ process for BWS is unfounded for two reasons. One, the importance of BWS testimony
has already been recognized by the Legislature, and therefore
Governor Wilson's description of BWS as a "novel defense" is
incorrect. The Legislature's purpose in enacting Evidence Code
Section 1107 was to ensure that the courts would admit BWS
evidence in criminal cases. 212 Governor Wilson must have understood the significance of BWS expert testimony; he did sign Section 1107 into law. Two, the law must change to accommodate
scientific and social progress or people will lose confidence in the
law. The law is not a stagnant body of rules. Our system of government is built on the idea that if change need occur, the legislature as the representative of the people shall enact new laws.
This very process was exemplified in the enactment of Evidence
207. See id. at 2.
208. See id.
209. See AB 2295, supra note 1.
210. See letter from Michael W. Sweet, California District Attorneys Association,
Legislative Advocate, to the Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor of California 1·2 (Sept.
27, 1993)[hereinafter Sweetj(on file with the author).
211. See id.
212. See AB 785, supra note 83.
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Code Section 1107. The problems of domestic violence and its
widespread effect on society are only recently being addressed. illS
The importance of BWS, a defense which had gained acceptability, was recognized and codified by the legislative and executive
branches of California state government. 214
Second, Governor Wilson's claim that a defendant has other
available legal alternatives wholly misses the point of AB 2295's
purpose, namely to remedy the injustice of permitting battered
women tried after January 1, 1992 to use BWS expert testimony
while prohibiting those convicted prior to this date from benefitting by the provisions of Evidence Code Section 1107. AB 2295
was legislation designed specifically to correct this inequity.
Other legal aiternativesllili are not the issue here since AB 2295
sought to provide a special avenue applicable to only a limited
section of the prisoner population because the Legislature realized that other remedies were insufficient.1l16
Third, Governor Wilson's concern regarding the application
of AB 2295 to cases involving guilty pleas is baseless for two reasons. One, Governor Wilson based his denial of Geneva Love's
petition for clemency, in part, on the fact that applications for
clemency are not processed with the safeguards and sanctions
available in the courts.217 Governor Wilson obviously recognizes
that the complicated legal implications surrounding BWS are
best handled by the courts. AB 2295 provided safeguards for a
judge's review of petitions. If the requirements for the petition
were not satisfied; e.g., if the necessary corroborating evidence
was not shown, the judge would not grant a new trial. The
CDAA letter withdrawing opposition to AB 2295 conceded that
it contained sufficient safeguards. 218 This provides strong support in favor of giving deference to the courts to exercise their
discretion in reviewing petitions under AB 2295. Two, a plea of
guilty does not necessarily mean the defendant is factually
guilty. The decision to plea may have resulted from weighing the
213. See Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 6-7; Assembly Concurrent Resolution 10, Cal. Senate, 1993-94 Reg. Sess.
214. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
215. Such as petitions for writs of habeas corpus. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1473 et
seq.
216. See AB 2295, supra note 1.
217. See Denial, supra note 189, at 3.
218. Sweet at 1.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/4

28

Baker: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned

1994]

BATTERED WOMEN UNJUSTLY IMPRISONED

127

evidence at the time of trial against any defenses available. Of
critical importance in this decision-making process is the defendant and her attorney's belief concerning whether or not
BWS testimony would provide a defense. If BWS testimony was
not likely to be admitted or was not admitted, a plea of guilty
based on a plea bargain may have been the least severe option
available. Also, although trial testimony will likely be absent in
cases involving guilty pleas, evidence should exist in the district
attorney's file. This generally includes police reports, witness
statements, and other relevant evidence. 219 Furthermore, the issue should not be decided based on the difficulties and costs involved in administering a remedy such as AB 2295 when a person's freedom and liberty are at stake.
It would appear that even Governor Wilson, at some level,
recognizes the importance of BWS expert testimony. After all,
he personally signed Section 1107 into law. Nevertheless, the
question as to what will be done for battered women convicted
prior to the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 remains.
The scrutiny that a bill undergoes while making its way
through the legislative process is sufficient to assure that any
precedent established by passing are-introduced AB 2295, for
recognizing and providing special standards for particular types
of psychological defenses, will be carefully examined. 220 The
Governor may always exercise the veto power when legislation is
deemed inappropriate. The Legislature could then act to address
the Governor's concerns in the next session. This process will
guarantee that as new defenses are recognized, the legislative
and executive branches will be able to weigh the appropriateness
of recognition and codification.
The following modifications are suggested to address the
concerns Governor Wilson enumerated in his veto message. Specifically, language should be added to AB 2295 which provides
that: (1) BWS is not a "novel defense," and (2) "other legal alternatives" available to battered women convicted prior to the
219. See Barbara Marmor, When Domestic Violence Supports a Defense to Homicide, CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION PROSECUTOR'S NOTEBOOK, Volume XI
at 9, 11.
220. At the time this article went to press, AB 2295 was in the process of being reintroduced in the California Assembly.
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enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 are not sufficient to
remedy the inequity discussed in this article. Also, language setting forth the judge's discretion and important role in safeguarding against fraudulent or inadequate petitions should be added.
This would address Governor Wilson's concern regarding the
treatment of guilty pleas. By far the most important reason for
re-introducing AB 2295 with language addressing Governor Wilson's concerns is to provide the battered individuals convicted of
killing their abusive partners prior to the enactment of Evidence
Code Section 1107 the same opportunities to offer BWS evidence as those whose trials came after January 1, 1992.
VI. CONCLUSION
AB 2295 was designed to provide a fair and even application
of the law to those individuals affected by the issue of BWS.
Battered women charged with criminal activity after January 1,
1992 are permitted to present BWS expert testimony at their
trial pursuant to Evidence Code Section 1107. Battered women
convicted prior to this date remain unjustly imprisoned with
seemingly no viable avenue of relief. AB 2295 was developed to
provide a remedy to these individuals.
AB 2295 was based on the belief that justice should be applied equally. AB 2295 contained the necessary safeguards to
guarantee that the modified writ process would not be abused by
fraudulent claims.
The issue regarding AB 2295 is not one of administrative
difficulties, costs, or economy; it is a question of what is fair and
just. The battered women convicted prior to January 1, 1992 and
unjustly imprisoned in California's penal system have been denied a fair trial because they lacked the opportunity to present
all relevant evidence. These women should not be subject to the
further deprivation of their rights and liberty simply because the
present Governor appears to have: (1) closed clemency as an avenue of relief while implying that the issue is one for the courts
to address, and (2) vetoed the legislature's only response to solving the inequity presented by Evidence Code Section 1107.
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APPENDIX A
AB 2295 would add and repeal Chapter 5 (commencing with
Section 1266) of Title 9 of Part 2 of, the Penal Code, as follows:
CHAPTER 5. WRIT OF ERROR REGARDING
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
1266. (a) The Legislature hereby finds and de. clares that a unique circumstance exists today
that necessitates remedial legislation with regard
to victims of battered woman syndrome. In this
regard, a small number of individuals are currently serving terms of imprisonment substantially longer than would persons charged today of
identical offenses. These individuals, victims of
domestic violence, were convicted of killing their
abusers prior to the courts appreciating the relevance of battered woman syndrome expert testimony to issues of self-defense or heat of passion.
Battered woman syndrome expert testimony is
critical to understanding a battered person's actions and beliefs which may appear unreasonable
to the average person. A remedy to this circumstance should be provided in the courts where
procedural safeguards and sanctions are available.
It is therefore the intent of the Legislature in
enacting this section to extend a writ of error
coram nobis or writ of error coram vobis to those
individuals convicted before January 1, 1992, who
would have benefited by the admission of battered woman syndrome evidence pursuant to Section 1107 of the Evidence Code. It shall not be a
basis for denial of the writ if issues relevant to
self-defense, sudden quarrel, or heat of passion
were introduced at time of trial. This section is
not intended to change the elements of any crime.
It is only intended to make changes with respect
to the writ of error coram nobis with respect to
evidence as it relates to battered woman
syndrome.
(b) If a petition for a writ of error coram nobis or
writ of error coram vobis is brought to procure a
vacation of a judgment and the verified petition
for the writ satisfactorily shows that all of the following conditions are met, the court shall grant
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the writ of error coram nobis or writ of error
coram vobis:
(1) The petitioner's judgment of conviction for a
violation of Section 187 resulted from a plea or
trial that commenced before January 1, 1992, the
date Section 1107 was added to the Evidence
Code, and the petitioner is imprisoned at the time
of filing the verified petition.
(2) The foundational requirements of Section
1107 of the Evidence Code would be met, based
on facts set forth in the verified petition.
(3) Any material evidence that would have been
admissible pursuant to Section 1107 of the Evidence Code was not admitted; and the facts established on a hearing of the writ show that had
the evidence of battered woman syndrome been
presented, there is a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceedings would have been different, sufficient to undermine confidence in the
judgment of conviction.
(4) The battered woman syndrome evidence relates to the battering of the petitioner by the victim of the homicide.
(c) In determining whether to issue the writ, the
court shall take both of the following into
consideration:
(1) The state of the record and the evidence.
(2) Whether there is any evidence of abuse in the
record, or whether the underlying facts of abuse
alleged by the p.etitioner were asserted by the petitioner prior to conviction or are corroborated by
other evidence. Corroborating evidence includes,
but is not limited to, medical records, verified witness statements, and court records from any other
proceeding.
(d) Sections 1260, 1261, and 1262 shall apply to
the granting of a writ of error coram nobis or writ
of error coram vobis.
1267. This chapter shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1998, and as of that date is
repealed. III

221. AB 2295. supra note 1.
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